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Abstract  
This paper reviews the development of the agricultural sector in Myanmar after the transition 
to an open economy in 1988 and analyzes the nature as well as the performance of the 
agricultural sector. The avoidance of social unrest and the maintenance of control by the 
regime are identified as the two key factors that have determined the nature of agricultural 
policy after 1988. A major consequence of agricultural policy has been a clear difference in 
development paths among the major crops. Production of crops that had a potential for 
development showed sluggish growth due to policy constraints, whereas there has been a 
self-sustaining increase in the output of those crops that have fallen outside the remit of 
agricultural policy. 
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Introduction 
 
Myanmar’s economy before 1988 was best characterized by isolation from the outside world. This 
paper aims to review the development process of the agricultural sector after 1988, with special 
reference to the extent to which the economy has been involved with, and influenced by, the 
international markets. This involves exploring how Myanmar succeeded in making the best of the 
sub-sectors in which it enjoyed comparative advantage, and the extent to which it overcame, or 
failed to overcome, the demerits of the sub-sectors in which there was no comparative advantage. An 
analysis carried out from this perspective makes it possible to examine the significance and the role 
that the agricultural sector played in the development of Myanmar’s economy in transition. 
Many analysts agree that the economic policy of Myanmar during the socialist period (1962-88), 
especially up to the early 1970s, was essentially a policy of agricultural exploitation, with heavy 
emphasis on rice production (Tin Soe and Fisher 1990, Takahashi 2001, Myat Thein 2004). 
A policy of agricultural exploitation generally implies the following two elements. First, food 
prices are repressed and wages are kept at a low level in order to promote industrialization. Second, 
export crops are purchased at a price lower than the international price, and the resulting revenue is 
used to promote industrialization. In this sense, the rice policy of Myanmar in the socialist period 
was a typical policy of agricultural exploitation. Not only did the government introduce a 
compulsory paddy procurement system at below-market prices and a system of rationing the supply 
of cheap rice to consumers through people’s shops and cooperatives,1 but it also monopolized rice 
exports, which became the largest source of foreign exchange earnings at that time. 
Meanwhile, however, it should be noted that the existence of a procurement and rationing 
system of itself does not necessarily indicate an exploitative policy. Consider for example the case of 
edible oil. The socialist regime adopted a self-sufficiency policy with regard to edible oil production 
even though Myanmar had no comparative advantage in this sub-sector. It was very likely that the 
domestic price of edible oil was well above the international price and thus farmers were ‘protected’ 
by limiting imports, even though a procurement and rationing system similar to the one applied to 
                                                  
1 The transportation cost for rice distribution was subsidized by the government, and this resulted in a 
lower rice price even in border districts far removed from the major rice-producing areas. This 
nation-wide distribution of rice supported by the government promoted a shift in the consumption pattern 
of staple food and resulted in a huge increase in rice consumption throughout the country. 
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rice production was adopted in respect of oilseed crops such as sesame and groundnuts. 
As will be described later, imports of edible oil increased dramatically after 1988. As a result, 
the domestic edible oil price was lowered to a level close to that of the international price. On the 
other hand, there was a remarkable increase in exports of pulses and beans, and before long, they 
became Myanmar’s largest export item. In due course the domestic price of pulses increased quite 
rapidly. Pulses and beans underwent a process of rapid adjustment with the international market 
price. In this sense, the largest change that Myanmar agriculture has experienced since 1988 has 
been departure from a closed trade regime, which had been isolating the domestic market from the 
international market. 
By contrast, in the case of rice, since 1988 the domestic price has been continuously repressed 
at about half of the international price, although the disparity narrowed somewhat over time. On the 
other hand, the indispensable inputs needed for rice cultivation (chemical fertilizer and diesel oil) 
have strengthened their linkages to the international market, insofar as recently, they have begun to 
be imported on a purely commercial basis. This means that the rice sector in Myanmar has itself 
strengthened its linkage with the international market, albeit in a rather asymmetric way, and with 
the result that in this respect, the sufferings of the Myanmar government and of the farmers have 
come to converge. 
It is true that even after 1988 farmers in Myanmar continued to be controlled by the ‘three 
internal major agricultural systems’ inherited from the socialist period, namely the procurement 
system, the planned cropping system and the state ownership of farmland, a point stressed by 
Takahashi (Takahashi 2001). It can even be argued that after 1988, the government tightened these 
systems to control farmers. However, at the same time, Myanmar agriculture is being forced to come 
to terms with the current wave of internationalization. Given that internationalization is inevitable, 
how to make the best use of its merits while at the same time minimizing its demerits is the key to 
successful reform of the domestic control systems. In analyzing trends in the agricultural sector after 
1988, this paper attempts to emphasize the transition to an open economy, rather than the transition 
to a market economy in general. For this very reason, the paper focuses on broader measures rather 
than simply domestic factors and it is hoped that by doing so, it will fill a gap in previous research. 
We group the major agricultural products of Myanmar into the following four categories: export 
crops, crops for import competition, crops for the domestic market and crops for state–owned 
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enterprises. We believe that this is the most appropriate classification for analyzing the problems 
encountered by crop production in Myanmar in the course of internationalization. 
Specifically, the categories comprise the following: export crops (rice and pulses), crops for 
import competition (oilseeds), crops for the domestic market (vegetables, fruits, meat and fishery 
products), and crops for state-owned enterprises (sugarcane and cotton).2 
The contents of the paper are as follows. Section 1 reviews the development of the agricultural 
sector since 1988 in the context of trends in the national economy as a whole. Section 2 discusses 
performance, and analyzes the factors that have determined performance for each of the major 
agricultural products contained in the four main categories of crop production. By way of conclusion, 
the nature of Myanmar’s agricultural policies and the agricultural developments that can be 
attributed to these policies will be briefly summarized. 
 
1.? Performance of the Agricultural Sector in the National Economy 
Let us first look briefly at the performance of the agricultural sector and its role in the overall 
economic development of Myanmar. 
Table 1 indicates the changes in the composition of GDP by sector and annual growth rates 
since the early 1980s. The agricultural sector was surprisingly slow to lose its relative importance in 
terms of its contribution to GDP, and accounted for more than 40 % of GDP even in recent years (at 
1985/86 constant prices). This suggests that the agricultural sector has been growing at a pace equal 
to those of the other sectors of the economy. 
The table also shows that the GDP share of agriculture is significantly higher at current prices 
than at 1985/86 constant prices. The discrepancy between the two widened very sharply between 
1985/86-1990/91 and the divergence increased further until 1994/95. This means that agricultural 
prices, which in the socialist period had been highly repressed compared to non-agricultural prices, 
were ‘normalized’ by the mid 1990s.3 In general, the rate of increase of agricultural retail prices was 
higher than that of the CPI. 
Table 2 shows the differences in the rate of price increase among crops in this respect. First, for 
                                                  
2 There are of course exceptions to the categorization that we have employed. For example, sesame is an 
export crop, and some of the crops that we have classified as crops for the domestic market are also 
exported (e.g. prawns and fish, and garlic and onions). 
3 A similar development also occurred in China between 1978 and the mid-1980s. 
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export crops, the rate of price increase was generally quite high. Domestic prices, repressed at a very 
low level, have risen dramatically because of the stimulus provided by international prices, and this 
has resulted in a sharp increase in production and in exports. Second, the price of import competition 
crops increased by only a small amount, since the expansion of imports prevented a surge in 
domestic prices. Third, crops destined for the domestic market underwent a fairly large increase in 
price. This may well be the result of the high income elasticity of items such as vegetables, meat and 
fishery products. 
In sum, the role of the agricultural sector in Myanmar’s economic recovery and growth after 
1988 was very important, and remained so until the mid-1990s. This was made possible largely 
through the price incentives given to the farmers. The agricultural marketing reforms of 1987 were 
in general quite effective in achieving an adjustment between hitherto highly repressed agricultural 
prices and international prices. The rate of price increase was very high, not only for a few (but 
important) export crops but also for a variety of crops intended for the domestic market. Farmers 
responded quickly to the new economic opportunities. 
Increases in agricultural production can be achieved either by an expansion of the sown area or 
by a rise in crop yields per unit area of land. This being the case, how did Myanmar increase its farm 
output? 
Table 3 sets out the changes in the sown acreage of major crops. The total sown acreage, which 
was 24 million acres in the late 1980s, has increased rapidly to 40 million acres in recent years.4 
Since the land frontier disappeared long ago in Myanmar, this expansion of sown acreage can be 
mostly attributed to the intensification of land use, or in other words to a rise in cropping intensity. 
The sown acreage expanded in the case of almost every crop, except for oil seeds which are typical 
crops for import competition. Rice, pulses, vegetables (chilli, onion and garlic), cotton, sugarcane 
and rubber all merit particular attention in this regard. 
Table 4, by contrast, shows the changes in yield for major crops. A notable feature revealed by 
Table 4 is that except for rice and rubber, yields have not shown any upward trend since 1988. We 
can conclude that the development of the agricultural sector during the period was achieved through 
the expansion of the sown acreage and not through improvements in land productivity. 
                                                  
4 There is of course the possibility that the rapid increase in the sown acreage in the late 1990s is the 
result of some statistical adjustment. 
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Finally, the contribution of agriculture to total exports over the same period is briefly reviewed 
(Table 5). According to Table 5, in the early years, agricultural exports (here defined broadly to 
include livestock, fishery products and timber) had a dominant share, and accounted for over 85% of 
total exports. In particular, the two dominant agricultural exports, rice and teak wood, amounted to 
more than 65% of all exports. However, after 1988, this mono-culture export structure underwent 
quite a dramatic transformation. 
First, pulses increased markedly as an important export item. Exports of pulses by value 
overtook exports of rice and teak combined by the mid-1990s, and came to account for between 20 
and 25% of total exports. Second, exports of fishery products increased after the mid-1990s, just as 
the momentum in the increase of pulse exports was beginning to slow down. The main item was 
prawns. Third, exports of non-agricultural commodities have increased since the late 1990s. The 
expansion of garment exports in the late 1990s and an increase in natural gas exports in more recent 
years, have been quite prominent features of Myanmar’s changing export structure. 
To summarize, the export structure of Myanmar has departed from a mono-culture pattern in 
which rice and teak wood were dominant, and has diversified, first into a variety of agricultural 
commodities and more recently into non-agricultural commodities, a category that has become 
increasingly important in the last few years. It should be noted, however, that exports of 
non-agricultural commodities are very much dominated by two items, garments and natural gas. 
Thus, agricultural exports still remain important for Myanmar’s economy. 
 
2. The Nature and the Determinants of the Production Performance of Major Crops 
This section will analyze and identify the main determinants of the production performance of major 
crops in Myanmar after 1988. 
 
2.1 Export Crops 
Export crops are here defined as the crops in which Myanmar enjoys comparative advantage. 
Whether Myanmar has always succeeded in exploiting comparative advantage in these categories is 
of course another issue. Although typical of its agriculture, rice is a crop whose production potential 
Myanmar has failed to exploit. By contrast, cultivation of pulses and beans has been a notable 
success story. The critical difference between the two is that rice is a staple food and has a significant 
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position in the people’s diet and any price hike therefore affects consumers badly. This is not the 
case for pulses in Myanmar.  
 
(1) Rice 
Rice is the key crop in the agriculture of Myanmar and has great significance for the national 
economy. Since several observers have already undertaken research on rice cultivation in Myanmar 
(Takahashi 2000, Garcia et.al. 2000, Fujita and Okamoto 2000, Fujita 2003, and Kurosaki et.al. 
2004), we will here try to avoid overlap with existing studies, and will confine ourselves to a concise 
summary. 
 
A. Changes in rice price 
Changes in the rice price will be examined first. A sharp increase in the rice price, far exceeding the 
rise in the CPI, occurred just after the liberalization of the agricultural market in 1987 (Table 2). 
Figure 1 indicates trends in the rice price and in the CPI. The rice price was 1.77 times higher than 
the CPI in 1989 and 1.75 times higher in 1993, a serious situation that caused considerable anxiety 
for the government. A widespread sense of crisis forced the government to take measures such as the 
exclusion of rice from marketing liberalization in 19885 and the introduction of the summer paddy 
program, initiated in 1992/93, for boosting rice production. Secondly, however, despite such 
measures, the rice price was kept at a relatively high level until 2001, when it finally converged with 
the CPI. It should be noted that another emergency situation in terms of the rice price level occurred 
around 1999 (Figure 1). 
Let us now examine the surge in the rice price from a different angle. Figure 2 illustrates the 
ratio of the domestic price to the international price of rice between the mid 1980s and the early 
2000s.6 
According to the figure, the domestic price was between one seventh and one eighth of the 
international price in 1983/84, which shows that the domestic rice price was repressed at an 
                                                  
5 The paddy procurement system was revived. However, surplus paddy could be sold in the market, while 
entry of the marketing agents (traders and rice millers) was practically free. In this sense, it is more 
appropriate to say that rice was liberalized only partly. See Okamoto (2005) for further discussion. 
6 We took the retail price, not the wholesale price, as the domestic price, simply because of the lack of 
wholesale price data for the socialist period. 
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extremely low level during the socialist period. However, the ratio thereafter increased rapidly, 
reaching about 1/3-1/4 by the end of the socialist period. After 1988 it further increased and reached 
its peak (0.7) in 1989/90. Thereafter, it fell to 0.25 in 1991/92, before again rising to 0.6 in 1993/94. 
From then on, with wide fluctuations, it averaged around 0.6, meaning that the domestic price was 
40% lower than the international price. 
To summarize, despite the government’s intention and efforts, the rice market in Myanmar 
could not be protected from internationalization. Though the price disparity has been largely 
corrected compared to the socialist period or to the early 1990s, the gap still remains large, and the 
disparity continues to be the main factor hampering the development of the rice sector in Myanmar. 
Furthermore, what made the situation even worse for Myanmar rice farmers was the fact that 
they could not receive the already low domestic market price fully, because of the existence of the 
government paddy procurement system. 
The paddy procurement system was abolished in 1987 but re-introduced, after only one year, in 
1988. However, a lowering of the quota to the level of 10-12 baskets per acre (1 basket of paddy 
equals 20.9 kg) reduced the farmers’ burden to a large extent. This improvement was possible 
because of the reduction in the scale of the rice rationing system; rice came to be provided only to 
targeted groups including civil servants. In addition, summer paddy was exempted from the 
procurement obligation in order to provide an incentive to farmers to expand summer paddy 
cultivation. 
Despite the scaling down of the system, however, the paddy procurement system has been a 
heavy drag for rice farmers. First, the procurement price has been far below the (domestic) market 
price, and the price disparity can be as large as 50-60% (Okamoto 2005). Second, it is possible that 
the burden borne by the farmers is even heavier than hinted at by the official statistics. If the yield 
per acre is about 60 baskets as is claimed in the official statistics, the burden on farmers will be less 
than 20% of total production. But there is a possibility that the official figures are over-reported.7 If 
this is the case and the actual yield is only 40-45 baskets per acre, the farmers’ burden would be 
more onerous, by as much as 25-30% of production. 
For a lengthy period, the system kept the producers’ price far below the market price, which 
                                                  
7 There are two grounds for authors recognizing this possibility. First, it is reported that there was a huge 
gap in the yield of rice between the official record and estimates carried out in the field. Second, per 
capita supply of rice is unrealistically high if we rely purely on official production statistics.  
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itself was already quite low by comparison with the international price.8 However, this procurement 
system was finally abolished in 2003/04. 
 
B. Changes in rice production 
As stated earlier, the main element of rice production policy after 1988 was the summer paddy 
program initiated in 1992/93.9 For promoting summer paddy production, investment in irrigation 
was indispensable not only in the dry zone in Upper Myanmar but also in Lower Myanmar. In this 
sense, the program was essentially an irrigation development program. 
Let us now look at Table 6. The irrigated area was stagnant at about 2.48 million acres until 
1991/92, but then expanded rapidly, reaching 4.55 million acres in 1999/2000. What should be 
stressed here is that, out of the increase of irrigated area of 2 million acres, the area under pump 
irrigation, which amounts to no less than 1.65 million acres, accounts for the dominant share.10 
Table 7, which indicates the sown acreage of summer paddy by region, clearly shows that the 
increase in summer paddy acreage was prominent in the Delta, especially in Ayeyarwaddy Division, 
where pump irrigation is dominant. 
The development of pump irrigation in the Delta area was achieved on the basis of 1) the 
construction of sluice gates by the Irrigation Department in order to adjust the water level of rivers 
and canals, 2) the construction of drainage channels (which are used for irrigation in the dry season) 
using the voluntary labor of village residents, and 3) farmers’ private investment in water pumps 
(Fujita and Okamoto 2000, Fujita 2003). Despite its importance, the government’s financial support 
of pump irrigation remained relatively small.11 
By contrast, the government has invested a huge amount in canal irrigation projects, including 
                                                  
8 Under the system that quota obligation is uniformly fixed per acre, the average effective price will be 
lower for the small farmers whose marketable surplus is smaller. 
9 After the mid 1990s, the policy also stressed self-sufficiency of rice in each locality, including rice 
deficit areas, such as the mountains and the dry zone. This conflicts starkly with the promotion of 
production based on the principle of comparative advantage. 
10 The number of irrigation pumps was 46,000 in 1990/91, 72,000 in 1995/96 and reached 155,000 in 
2000/01(CSO 2002). These pumps were mainly imported from China. 
11 Some water pumps (especially large pumps that take water directly from the Ayeyarwaddy River) are 
owned and maintained by Water Resources Utilization Department. However, in this type of irrigation too, 
there is almost no subsidy to farmers, as opposed to the case of canal irrigation. According to the author’s 
survey in Magway in July 2001, the water charge was 1,500 kyats per acre for summer paddy, 1,200 kyats 
for monsoon paddy, 750 kyats for monsoon oil seed crops and cotton, and 1,200 kyats for summer oilseed 
crops and cotton. There is a huge discrepancy between the water charge for canal irrigation which 
amounts to only 10 kyats per acre. 
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construction of reservoirs. In addition, by keeping the water charge at a nominal rate (10 kyats per 
acre), the government has provided a generous de facto subsidy for maintenance costs as well. 
Nevertheless, as shown in Table 6, the contribution of canal irrigation to overall irrigation 
development has been rather limited. 
Table 7 shows that the acreage of summer paddy expanded dramatically until 1995/96 but 
plunged in 1996/97, recovering only moderately after that. The slow down in summer paddy 
production was the main cause of the sluggish expansion of paddy production in Myanmar after the 
mid-1990s. Why was the summer paddy program thwarted? The answer can be found in the 
deterioration of profitability of summer paddy cultivation. Since pump irrigation has been introduced 
by private investment and depends on large amounts of expensive diesel oil, farmers are very 
sensitive to profitability. 
Let us look at Table 8, which summarizes the data from various surveys, showing the trend of 
profitability. 
The data for Kyaukse in 1993/94 and Htantabin in 1998/99 relate to a time when the rice price 
was high. In Kyaukse, the share of operators’ surplus increased to as much as 60% of gross revenue. 
Reflecting amongst other things the low cost of canal irrigation, the high profitability of summer 
paddy cultivation was at this time a notable feature. Despite its relatively higher cost structure 
arising from the local usage of pump irrigation, the case of Htantabin, too, shows that high rice 
prices allowed farmers to obtain reasonably high profits from summer paddy production. 
However, once the rice price falls, the intrinsically expensive nature of pump irrigation emerges 
as a serious drawback for farmers. Let us examine the case of Myaungmya in 2000/01. Here there 
arose a literally disastrous situation for farmers cultivating summer paddy. The operators’ surplus 
was almost nil. By contrast, in the same year, the profitability of summer paddy production in the 
canal irrigation area of Kyaukse did not deteriorate to the same extent.12 
In the context of the vulnerability of pump-irrigated summer paddy production, severe conflict 
soon broke out between farmers and the government once the rice price declined. It is true that 
government pressures had penetrated deeply into rural areas, but at the same time, farmers 
persistently attempted to resist such influences. This was especially evident in 2000-2001, when the 
                                                  
12 However, it should be noted that the difference in productivity in Myaungmya and Kyaukse is partly 
because the rice price fell to a lesser extent in Upper Myanmar than in Lower Myanmar. 
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rice price collapsed. 13 
Generally speaking, rice production became unattractive for farmers after the mid 1990s. This 
was not just because of low rice prices, but also because of high input prices. 
 
C. Changes in input supply 
The deterioration of profitability of summer paddy cultivation is not merely the outcome of sluggish 
rice prices. Price hikes of inputs such as chemical fertilizer, diesel oil and agricultural machinery 
also had a serious negative effect. The problem was that farmers had no alternative but to depend on 
these inputs which are mostly imported on a purely commercial basis. It is here relevant to note that 
foreign assistance was not provided after 1988,14 and at the same time the government has also been 
obliged to abolish subsidies on these inputs. 
Figure 3 shows the changes in the supply of chemical fertilizers including both imported and 
domestically produced fertilizer. The supply of domestic fertilizer declined because of the 
degradation of producing factories and the difficulty of obtaining raw materials for the fertilizer 
factories.15 This fall in supply had to be made good by imports. Consequently, the dependence on 
imports increased after 1993/94. 
The figures for imports are the sum of imports by the government (Ministry of Agriculture and 
Irrigation and Ministry of Commerce) and by private enterprises. Despite government attempts to 
boost private imports by providing import duty exemption, private imports failed to increase, and the 
government continued to be the main importer (Takahashi 2000, p.39-40). Fluctuations in import 
volume after 1993/94 may possibly be the result of the insufficient allocation of foreign exchange to 
government agencies for importing fertilizer. 
The government has been distributing chemical fertilizers to farmers through Myanma 
Agriculture Service (MAS) which has a broad network of agencies in rural areas. Among all crops of 
Myanmar, rice has a dominant share so far as the receipt of fertilizer is concerned, and even after the 
1990s accounted for over 80% of the total volume of fertilizer made available for cultivation 
                                                  
13 See Fujita (2003) for further discussion. 
14 After the late 1970s, there was a big flow of chemical fertilizers almost free of cost, mainly through 
official development assistance (2KR) provided by Japan (Saito 1987). 
15 There are three factories in Myanmar. Two are urea factories constructed in the 1970s, with a 
production capacity of 200-260 tons per day. One is a urea factory constructed by the official assistance of 
Germany in 1985 and has a capacity of 1,200 tons per day (FANDINAP 1987, 2-3). 
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(CSO1997, 2000). 
Figure 4 provides an estimate for the volume of chemical fertilizer used for paddy, assuming 
that 80% of total supply was allocated for paddy cultivation. The fertilizer applied reached 75 kg per 
hectare in the peak year (1985/86) and went down to 30 kg in the early 1990s, and has been 
fluctuating widely in the range of between 30 and 60 kg. It is clear from these figures that fertilizer 
application per hectare is low in Myanmar in comparison with the international average.16 
After the late 1980s, the price of chemical fertilizer increased sharply. As was pointed out 
earlier, the rice price also increased very steeply after the mid 1980s. Nevertheless, the price ratio of 
rice/fertilizer deteriorated rapidly (Table 9). This means that fertilizer prices increased at an even 
faster pace than rice prices. 
The government official price of fertilizer was kept low for 15 years until 1987/88 (FADINAP 
1987, 14), but after the 1990s, it rapidly increased to a level close to the international price. Since the 
government was obliged to withdraw subsidies, the official price was raised frequently17 in 
accordance with rises in market prices. Because of difficulties in securing a sufficient supply, the 
government distribution of fertilizer shrank considerably in 2005.18 
Changes in diesel oil supply have also influenced paddy cultivation in Myanmar. As is the case 
with fertilizer, most of Myanmar’s diesel oil is imported and the domestic price has risen quite 
rapidly. In order to support summer paddy production, the government has been providing diesel oil 
at a lower cost to those farmers who cultivate summer paddy using pump irrigation. In 2001, for 
example, the market price per gallon was 350-600 kyats while the official price was 160 kyats. In 
2004, the market price was 1,500-1,600 kyats while government price was 760 kyats. However, the 
supply remains insufficient. According to our surveys,19 whereas one acre of pump irrigation 
required 6-10 gallons, government distribution remained around 3.5-4 gallons. It should be noted 
                                                  
16 Since data for fertilizer input per hectare for rice cultivation only is not available, we have used the 
average figure in kilograms for the total cultivated area in 2000/01. It was 285 kg in Vietnam, 90 kg in 
Thailand, 130 kg in the Philippines and 256 kg in China. The increase in fertilizer application in Vietnam 
is quite prominent: it was only 88 kg per hectare in 1990/91, but jumped by almost 3.2 times over a 
period of 10 years. 
17 For example, the price was increased from 600 kyat per bag (1 bag contains 50 kg) to 1,200kyats in 
1995/96 and then to 2,000 kyats in 1996/97. The market price of urea was 2,300 kyats in 1999 and it was 
almost the same as the government official price which was 2,200 kyats (Fujita and Okamoto 2000, p.37). 
18 The official fertilizer price was kept at 6,000 kyats per bag in 2004/05 (market price was 
12,000-15,000 kyats), the same level as in the previous year. However, the distributed amount was 
reduced to only 1 bag per 4-5 acres (Survey in Bago Division in 2005). 
19 Based on surveys in Ayeyarwaddy Delta in 2001 and 2004 . 
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that the government’s policy of supplying diesel oil at a lower cost is very likely to be abolished in 
the near future along with the similar policy for chemical fertilizer. 
 
(2) Pulses 
The production of pulses in Myanmar underwent a remarkable development in both output and 
exports after the liberalization of agricultural marketing in 1987.20 It should be emphasized, 
however, that from the outset, the success of this sector was not really intended by the government. 
Indeed the government showed relatively little interest and the expansion in the production of pulses 
was led exclusively by the private sector. The government appreciated the sector’s success in later 
years and attempted to obtain part of the benefit of expansion by introducing a procurement system 
at the end of 1990s. This, however, did not succeed.21 
Among the 17 varieties of pulses produced in Myanmar, the three varieties of black gram, green 
gram and pigeon pea are particularly important. These three pulses account for between 80 and 90% 
of total exports by value. The main export destination is India (Table 10). The emergence of the large 
Indian market was a key factor underlying the development of pulse cultivation in Myanmar. 
In India, after the Green Revolution in the mid-1960s, production shifted to rice and wheat at 
the expense of pulse cultivation. The increase of pulse imports from Myanmar was the result of 
stagnation in domestic production of pulses as well as the relaxation of import regulations by the 
Indian government after 1991, when economic liberalization got underway (UN 1997, p.41, Rao 
1994, p.146). By 2002/03, pulses from Myanmar came to account for about 40% of India’s total 
pulse imports. 
Since there is no government regulation for exporting pulses from Myanmar (except for the 
10% export tax), the import demand of India was transmitted directly to Myanmar’s market, pushing 
domestic pulse prices in Myanmar upward (Table 2). The close linkage between the domestic and 
international prices of pulses is clearly shown in Figure 5. 
The increase in the acreage sown to pulses has been quite striking. Total acreage under the 
                                                  
20 See Okamoto (2006) for the discussion of marketing liberalization and its effect on the growth of 
production and export of pulses. 
21 Though the procurement system for pulses was revived together with sesame in 1999/2000, gathering 
the required amounts proved difficult. The system was finally abolished after two years of trial (Okamoto 
2006). 
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major three pulses increased by four times in ten years in the 1990s (Table 11). Figures 6, 7 and 8 
show the growth of production of black gram, green gram and pigeon pea, by region. The following 
points emerge from these figures. First, the expansion of the acreage under black gram and green 
gram first occurred in the Lower Myanmar region, being particularly conspicuous in Ayeyarwaddy 
and Bago. However, though the production of black gram is still concentrated in Lower Myanmar, 
green gram cultivation started to increase in Upper Myanmar, too, with Sagaing and Magway 
becoming important production regions in the mid-1990s. In recent years, these two regions have 
come to account for a larger acreage of green gram cultivation than Lower Myanmar. Second, pigeon 
pea is dominant in Upper Myanmar, in regions such as Sagaing, Magway and Mandalay. 
In Lower Myanmar, pulses were introduced everywhere as a second crop after monsoon paddy, 
a new development as there was virtually no second crop produced before 1988. In the dry season, 
idle land suddenly came to be utilized for the production of pulses. In order to cultivate rice in the 
dry season, as was noted earlier, irrigation is indispensable. But because irrigation is not necessary 
for pulses, the introduction of pulses was relatively undemanding. 
Table 12 illustrates the profitability of pulses under different cropping patterns, based on 
various field surveys, and also shows the changes in cropping systems that have come about as a 
result of the introduction of pulses. 
To illustrate trends in Lower Myanmar, the examples of Yangon Division in 1999/2000 and 
Bago Division in 2000/01 are examined. In both cases, farmers obtained a larger operator’s surplus 
and income from pulses than from monsoon paddy. By comparing the figures in Table 8, it becomes 
clearly apparent that pulses generally yield a higher profit than summer paddy. It is well known that 
in monsoon Asia as a whole, the cultivation of un-irrigated second crops following the main rice 
crop usually yields only a marginal profit. This however is not true for the cultivation of pulses in 
Myanmar.22 Pulses have made a huge impact on the farm economy. 
In sum, the development of pulses in Lower Myanmar in the 1990s can be characterized in 
terms of the so-called “vent for surplus” (Hla Myint 1971). Upon the sudden emergence of export 
demand, idle resources (land and labor in the dry season) came to be utilized effectively and 
                                                  
22 The explanation for this lies in Myanmar’s rice policy. Since the rice price is repressed far below the 
international price, the profitability of rice and pulses were reversed at the farmers’ level. In this sense, 
the success of pulses can be regarded as an unintentional fruit of Myanmar’s rice policy. See Kurosaki 
et.al (2004) for further discussion. 
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production expanded very quickly without substantial large investments (such as irrigation) being 
necessary.23 
 
2.2 Crops for Import Competition 
Oilseed is the second most important crop after paddy in the diet of the people of Myanmar. The 
edible oils traditionally consumed are groundnut oil and sesame oil.24 Sesame oil is estimated to 
account for between 5% and 10% of total edible oil consumption, while groundnut oil accounts for 
the remaining 90-95%.25 
As has already been pointed out, even though Myanmar has no comparative advantage in the 
production of oilseed crops, imports of oilseeds were strictly regulated and thus it is very likely that 
during the socialist period, the domestic price was higher than the international price. However, after 
the 1990s, the full-scale import of edible oils got underway (see Figure 9). Almost all (99%) of the 
imported edible oil is palm oil, mainly from Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. 
As can be seen in Figure 9, in some years imports have exceeded domestic production. The 
private sector began to import edible oils at an early stage, but after 1999, their import came to be a 
monopoly of Myanmar Economic Holdings (which is closely linked to the government). This 
suggests that shortage of foreign exchange available to the government, rather than overall foreign 
exchange constraints, is the main factor restricting the volume of palm oil imports. 
The huge quantity of palm oil imports was the main factor that determined trends in edible oil 
prices (Figure 10). The prices of sesame oil and groundnut oil are repressed in line with the price of 
imported palm oil26 and consequently they have increased at a lower rate than the CPI. 
                                                  
23 The increase of rice production through rapid reclamation of the Delta in colonial Burma was also 
regarded as development by way of the “vent for surplus”. However, strictly speaking, the development 
of the Delta required investment in flood control and drainage. In contrast, the development of pulses in 
the 1990s literally did not require any investment, so that it was development in line with the theory of 
“vent for surplus” in the pure sense of the term. 
24 The preference of edible oil differs according to region. In Upper Myanmar, sesame oil is preferred, 
while groundnut oil is consumed more in Lower Myanmar. 
25 This is based on an interview with a large edible oil trader in Yangon in January 2005. Other 
domestically produced edible oil such as sunflower oil is generally sold after having been mixed with 
groundnut oil and sesame oil (MOAI 2000a). However, based on the figures from FAOSTAT, the market 
share of edible oil is different from the actual state; sesame oil is about 30%, groundnut oil is 40-50%, 
and the rest is sunflower oil and others. The reason may be that a large volume of sesame is very likely 
being exported illegally through cross-border trade. 
26 In rural areas where low-income groups predominate, only palm oil is consumed. However, in urban 
areas, some consumers avoid it because of its taste. 
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It is hardly surprising that in the absence of technological progress, this weak price trend of 
edible oil worked against the domestic production of oilseed crops. The sluggish expansion of the 
sown acreage of sesame and groundnut cultivation, as shown in Table 3, is a clear manifestation of 
this reality. Self-sufficiency in edible oil supplies is one of the three major goals of the agricultural 
policy of Myanmar, but although such is the intention of the government, there is as yet no sign of a 
clear trend towards an increase in production. 
Given that the country suffers from serious balance of payment deficits, how best to curb the 
volume of palm oil imports has come to be a big issue for the government. Figure 11 shows that the 
import value of edible oil is almost equal to the export value of pulses. The gap between the two 
after 1995 clearly indicates the pain that Myanmar government has been suffering as the foreign 
exchange constraint has tightened.27 This point is also evident in Figure 12 which compares the 
domestic and international prices of palm oil. The price gap widened after the mid-1990s, showing 
the probability of constraints operating so far as imports are concerned. 
Edible oil is quite essential for the people of Myanmar, and any rapid increase in its price could 
cause the government considerable anxiety, though to a lesser degree than in the case of a rise in the 
price of rice. The government could attempt to keep the domestic price low by increasing imports. 
Sometimes surges in the domestic price occur and cause the government considerable disquiet. The 
high fluctuations in palm oil import volumes in recent years may represent a kind of “swing” in the 
government’s attempts to deal with the problem. 
Rice gives rise to a similar problem in that the stabilization of prices at a low level is regarded 
as a most important priority. However, rice is the crop in which Myanmar has comparative 
advantage, and price stabilization can be achieved by various internal ‘regulative’ policies. Such is 
not the case for oilseed crops in which Myanmar has no comparative advantage. If imports are 
barred, there is no possibility of compensating by raising efficiency in domestic production.28 The 
                                                  
27 Needless to say, Figure 11 does not indicate that the import of palm oil is constrained by the amount of 
export earnings obtained from pulses. 
28 Since 1998-1999, oil palm plantations have been established by 17 large private companies in 
Tanintharyi, especially in the Kautaung region. Domestic palm oil will be supplied in large quantities in 
near future, although the cropped area was only 133,000 acres in 2004 and is likely to remain at a low 
level as would require 500,000 acres to replace all the imports by domestic production. In addition, 
sunflower production is being vigorously promoted by the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation in 
various parts of Myanmar. Nevertheless, the economic viability of these programs for private companies 
and farmers remains unclear. 
 18
alternative, by which Myanmar’s oilseed supplies depend entirely on high-handed policy decisions, 
is fraught with difficulty. 
 
2.3 Crops for the Domestic Market 
In this section, the crops that are produced essentially for the domestic market, such as vegetables, 
fruits, meat and fishery products, are dealt with briefly. As already noted, the price of these crops has 
increased at a rate slightly higher than the CPI (see Table 2). 
The output of crops that are indispensable for the diet of the Myanmar people, such as garlic, 
onion, and chilli, has not undergone any significant change, but the production of other types of 
vegetable and fruit increased quite dramatically after the mid-1990s (Figure 13). The same trend also 
can be observed for meat (especially chicken and pork29, see Figure 14) and fishery products (Figure 
15). Per capita meat consumption doubled from 4.8 kg in 1987/88 to 9.2 kg in 2001/02. So far as 
fishery products are concerned, the increase rate during the same period amounted to about 50%, 
from 17.5 kg to 25.9 kg.30 
To summarize, production of crops for the domestic market has increased in response to the 
expansion of the domestic market as part of the process of economic development, especially since 
the mid-1990s. However, fishery products (especially prawns) are an exception, since the increase 
was partly led by export demand. In recent years, be applied to the case of onion and chilli 
production, also, has begun to be stimulated by overseas demand. 
In general, the profitability of vegetable and fruit production is high,31 and an expansion of 
these crops has contributed substantially to the stimulation of the rural economy. Though it may 
sound rather too obvious, a key factor which has allowed the marketing of these perishable crops 
over a wide area has been improvement in the infrastructure, including the development of the road 
network. Table 13 clearly shows a sharp increase in the mileage of roads and in the number of trucks 
during the 1990s. Before the development of the road network, railways and waterways were the 
most common means of transportation. In those days, transportation was far more time consuming 
than it is today, and the area that rural commodities (especially perishable ones) could reach was 
                                                  
29 Generally speaking, beef is not preferred by consumers. Thus, the increase was not as evident as in the 
other categories of meat. 
30 Calculated based on CSO (2002). 
31 On the high profitability of vegetable production, see Kurosaki et.al (2004). 
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more limited. As this constraint was relaxed over time, it became possible to produce perishable 
crops even in remote areas far away from the main centers of consumption. 
 
2.4 Crops for State-Owned Enterprises 
Cotton, sugarcane, rubber and jute are industrial crops that are procured by the government as raw 
materials for state-owned enterprises. The sown area of the four crops accounts for only 3% or 
thereabouts of the total (average of 1987/88-2000/01). However, industrial crops are important as 
their production and marketing affects not only farmers and traders but also the management of 
state-owned enterprises and national fiscal conditions. In this section, the examples of sugarcane and 
cotton are briefly discussed. 
 
(1) Sugarcane32 
In 1994, state sugar factories under the Ministry of Industry (I) were transferred to the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Irrigation. The state-owned institution Myanma Sugarcane Enterprise (MSE) 
became responsible for the management of these factories. Furthermore, in 1997, it was decided to 
construct nine new sugar factories supported by foreign aid.33 Since 1998, some 17 factories have 
come into operation, and total production capacity has doubled from 8,600 tons to 17,500 tons per 
day. 
One of the characteristics of sugarcane is that the sugar content decreases rapidly unless the 
crop is processed soon after harvest. Furthermore, a modern sugar processing factory generally 
requires very substantial capital investment, and it follows that its performance is heavily influenced 
by the rate of capacity utilization. What this means in practice is that to ensure their supplies, the 
state-owned sugar factories prescribe procurement zones surrounding the mills, and require farmers 
in those zones to sell all their sugarcane output to the factory within whose zone they are located. 
The problem lies not in the physical procurement of the crop but in the price prescribed by the 
government, which for long was far lower than the market price. For example, the market price in 
2000 was 5,270-6,100 kyats per ton while the government procurement price was 2,500 kyats (Kudo 
2003, p.41). By contrast, since sugarcane farmers outside the procurement zones could sell freely in 
                                                  
32 For further discussion of sugarcane and sugar production, see Takahashi (2002) and Kudo (2003). 
33 Among 9 factories, 8 were constructed with Chinese assistance while the remaining one was 
constructed with Thai assistance. 
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the market, whether or not a sugarcane farmer’s fields were prescribed as part of a procurement zone 
determined his fate. 
Figure 16 indicates changes in the total sown acreage of sugarcane and shows changes in 
acreage in procurement and non-procurement zones. Sugarcane procurement zones began to expand 
in 1996/97 and then further increased in 1998/99 at a time when the new factories mentioned above 
were coming into operation. 
It should be noted here that non-procurement zones became more extensive from around 
1996/97 onwards. Underlying this trend were two background factors. First was the indirect effect of 
the expansion of the procurement zones. Because of the establishment of new state factories, private 
sugar processors in the area began to find it difficult to purchase raw materials, and the price of 
sugarcane increased accordingly. This in turn stimulated sugarcane production in other areas (Kudo 
2003, 40, Tin Htut Oo and Kudo eds. 2003,? p.262-263). Second, there was a general increase in 
domestic sugar demand. Since about the mid-1990s, the diet of the Myanmar people has become 
increasingly more diversified, and this has caused sugar demand to increase, in much the same way 
as demand for vegetables, fruit, meat and fishery products. 
 
(2) Cotton 
Cotton needs to undergo the cotton ginning process before yarn can be made by spinning. There are 
20 state-owned spinning mills run by the Ministry of Industry (I). State-owned cotton ginning 
factories that supply raw material to the spinning mills used to be run by the Ministry of Industry (I) 
as well, but in 1994/95, some factories were transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, 
and the Myanma Cotton and Sericulture Enterprise (MCSE) was established. MCSE became 
responsible for procuring the cotton procurement required for state enterprises as well. 
MCSE procures cotton either directly from farmers or from cotton traders. Cotton traders used 
to supply cotton exclusively for the private cotton ginning factories (the number reached 370 in 
2000/01), but after 1998 they were required to sell part of their cotton to the government (50% in 
1998, and 25% after 1999). 
Figure 17 indicates the trends in cotton supply, classified by governmental and private 
procurement. The big jump in production in 1995/96 was the result of an aggressive policy for 
expansion of the sown acreage of cotton just after the transfer of the responsible authority, as 
 21
described above. The objective was, needless to say, to ensure the supply of raw material for the 
state-owned cotton industry. However, as the graph indicates, the increase took the form of a steep 
rise in private procurement. It is obvious that MCSE did not succeed in procuring the planned 
amount. The application of the procurement system to cotton traders in 1998 was a last resort in the 
drive to ensure adequate supplies, but it failed to have any significant result. On average, the state 
sector succeeded in procuring only 52% of its needs during 1998/99-2000/02 (Tin Htut Oo and Kudo 
eds. 2003, p.323). 
The problem is, obviously, the low level of the procurement price. For example, in the case of 
2001/02, the market price was 370-375 kyat per viss (1.6 kg), whereas the government procurement 
price was 180 kyats (Tin Htut Oo and Kudo eds. 2003, p.315). 
 
Conclusion 
How can we best characterize agricultural policies in Myanmar after 1988? In the light of the narrow 
technical definition of the concept of an agricultural exploitation policy (that is, a policy that absorbs 
the surplus from agriculture and uses it as a base for economic development through 
industrialization), it would be inappropriate to state that an agricultural exploitation policy has been 
pursued, even after 1988. Rather, if it is examined dispassionately, the genuine policy objective of 
the government seems to consist of the following two elements: avoidance of social unrest and 
sustenance of the regime. 
These two main objectives have required agricultural policy to accord with the following two 
subordinate aims. One aim is to stabilize prices at a low level for the commodities that are 
indispensable for the people’s diet. The other is to sustain state enterprises in an agro-processing 
sector which depends for its raw materials on domestically produced agricultural commodities. 
The stabilization of essential agricultural prices at a low level conforms with the main objective, 
which is to avoid social unrest. This explains why agricultural policies in Myanmar have a strong 
inclination towards production increases for their own sakes while paying rather less attention to 
farmers’ income and welfare. The impact of such policies on the performance of the agricultural 
sector is summarized below. 
The key crops that are the most important for the people’s diet are rice and oilseeds. When the 
present regime was established in 1988, the first challenge they faced was a surge in the rice price. 
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However, for the government, a wholesale return to the system of the socialist period was not an 
option. Instead, they have adopted two measures. One is to restrain agricultural marketing reforms 
with respect to rice. The rice procurement and ration systems were maintained, although on a smaller 
scale than before, and rice exports continued to be a government monopoly. The other measure is an 
aggressive policy aimed at the stimulation of rice production, as exemplified in the summer paddy 
program. 
As has been fully discussed above, even though it slowed down half way through, the summer 
paddy program was successful overall. Further, thanks to the restrictions on rice exports, the regime 
almost succeeded in controlling rice prices. The domestic rice price continued to be about 40% lower 
than the international price. As Myanmar has comparative advantage in rice production, it was 
possible for it to achieve price stabilization, simply by strengthening the “inward” policy. 
It should be noted here that the same phenomenon can also be observed with regard to crops 
other than rice. Recently, onions and maize have provided good examples. In January 2004, exports 
of these commodities were suddenly prohibited so as to prevent the rise of domestic prices. 
By contrast, for another important crop, namely oilseeds, the government has stepped into the 
import of cheap edible oil (palm oil). That said, since the mid-1990s, imports have been somewhat 
constrained by strict foreign exchange conditions. A later policy introduced by the government was 
the promotion of new oilseed crops. Good examples are the attempt to introduce sunflower and the 
development of private large oil palm plantations in the southern part of the country. This policy, 
however, is a somewhat aggressive initiative, and one that is not entirely rational in economic terms. 
Moreover the policy has not always been welcomed by farmers or by private companies, and the 
prospects for it becoming a self-sustaining success seem rather remote. Above all, it remains the case 
that without the benefit of comparative advantage, achieving self-sufficiency in crops is a difficult 
task. 
The cultivation of sugarcane and cotton, meanwhile, has inevitably been heavily influenced by 
the government’s policy of making farmers and traders sell their produce at low prices so as to meet 
the goals of the state-owned processing enterprises. 
In summary, in recent years, rice, oilseed crops, industrial crops, onions and maize have been 
the crops on which the present government has placed a strong priority with the sustenance of the 
regime in mind. In this regard, the avoidance of social unrest and the maintenance of the state 
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enterprises have been two key imperatives. Farmers, traders and processors dealing with these crops 
are daily struggling to find a way of avoiding, or of reducing, the negative impact of government 
policy. The effect of the government’s role has been to limit exports (for example of rice, onions, and 
maize) and to promote the cultivation of crops under disadvantageous conditions (rice, oilseed crops, 
industrial crops). 
On the other hand, for those crops which lie outside the objectives of the state (in other words 
crops that have no role to play in the avoidance of social unrest or the maintenance of state 
enterprises), the government has been quite indifferent. Particularly surprising has been the 
government’s low interest in pulses which have become a most important export crop for Myanmar. 
Even in the major pulse-producing areas, the main task of government officials has been to take care 
of the politically important crops, especially rice. 
The same tendency can be observed as regards some of the crops, profitable for the farmers, 
which have been grown for the domestic market. Examples include tomatoes in the Inle Lake area, 
and chilli production in Kyaukse. In these areas, too, the agricultural administration have focused 
mainly on rice, whether with respect to the expanding the area under rice and or achieving an 
increase in yields, and have paid less attention to the cultivation of tomatoes or chilli. 
In fact, the agricultural development of Myanmar since 1988 has owed a lot to self-sustaining 
growth pioneered by the private sector, in crop categories that have fallen outside the main concerns 
of the government. In this respect, the role of the government has been minimal. Another notable 
feature is that development has not been supported by improvements in productivity. In particular, 
the success of pulses was due to the existence of a area that had formerly lain unused during the dry 
season. In this sense, the development pattern has been a typical example of the “vent for surplus”. 
The Myanmar government has been highly fortunate in that Myanmar has had room for 
development under the “vent for surplus” process. At the same time, however, a challenge will 
inevitably occur once the development potentiality of this path has been exhausted.34 Needless to 
say, opening up a development path through improvements in productivity would have been a far 
more difficult task. 
Finally, mention must be made of recent changes in rice policy in Myanmar. There can be no 
                                                  
34 According to interviews held at the Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry in January 2005, pulses can be expanded up to 10 million acres from the present sown acreage, 
which is 8 million. 
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doubt that the policy of keeping the rice price substantially lower than the international price has 
operated as one of the major constraints on the development of the rice sector in Myanmar. However, 
as the historical experience of Thailand and Vietnam shows, a low rice price policy can be adopted 
for a substantial period, while encouraging rice exports. 35  At the initial stage of economic 
development when the majority of the people remain poor, the risks that accompany a policy of 
exporting the staple food should not be underestimated. Liberalization of rice exports, even if 
unavoidable, should be conducted very cautiously.36 
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Table 1.Agriculture in Myanmar: Contribution to GDP and Growth Rates, 1980-2001
????
???
1985/
86
1990/
91
1991/
92
1992/
93
1993/
94
1994/
95
1995/
96
1996/
97
1997/
98
1998/
99
1999/
2000
2000/
01
Contribution to GDP ??????????? 47.9 48.2 48.0 46.5 47.3 46.7 46.0 45.1 44.4 43.6 43.0 43.2 42.3
(at 1985/86 constant price) ????? 39.4 39.7 38.7 37.5 38.4 37.9 37.6 37.1 36.2 35.2 34.5 34.4 33.1
????????????????????? 7.0 7.1 7.9 7.2 7.3 7.2 7.1 6.8 7.2 7.3 7.5 7.9 8.3
???????? 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9
????????????? 9.6 9.9 7.7 9.1 8.9 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.4 10.1
Contribution to GDP ??????????? 46.5 48.2 57.3 58.8 60.5 63.0 63.0 60.0 60.1 58.9 59.1 59.9 57.3
?????????????????? ????? 38.8 39.7 46.3 48.4 50.6 54.1 55.2 53.2 53.2 52.1 52.3 52.2 48.8
????????????????????? 6.3 7.1 9.2 8.8 8.5 7.7 6.8 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 7.2 7.9
???????? 1.5 1.4 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6
????????????? 9.5 9.9 7.8 7.0 6.9 6.8 6.2 6.9 7.1 7.1 7.0 6.5 7.2
???????????????? GDP 7.9 2.9 2.8 -0.6 9.7 6.0 7.5 6.9 6.4 5.7 5.8 10.9 13.6
????? 12.6 2.2 2.0 -3.9 12.4 4.7 6.7 5.5 3.8 3.0 3.5 10.5 9.5
????????????????????? 4.0 2.0 -0.6 5.7 4.5 4.8 6.0 3.0 11.9 7.1 9.3 16.8 18.9
???????? 1.9 -0.1 8.3 -1.7 -3.3 1.0 -14.3 -4.5 2.1 2.8 3.2 4.6 3.3
????????????? 6.9 2.9 0.1 -4.0 10.8 9.4 8.5 7.6 4.6 5.0 6.2 14.5 23.0
Sources: CSO, Statistical Yearbook (1997, 2002) .
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Table 2: Changes in Price of Major Agricultural, Livestock and Fishery Products, 1987-2001 (1986=100)
Crop 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Rice (Emata) 112 191 339 266 306 503 864 796 1132 1286 1389 1907 2817 2548 2489
1 Export Crops Pegion Pea 100 859 895 1286 2308 2677 2969 3693 6459 7049 7186 14643 15787 10355 13614
Black Gram 100 463 579 699 1480 1547 1065 2154 3578 3390 3434 6157 7060 9773 13227
Prawns 158 138 193 241 364 410 539 731 1121 1919 2444 4168 3926 3936 3943
Sesame Oil 127 135 143 165 232 365 328 434 585 572 912 1572 1772 1474 1904
Groundnut Oil 130 144 144 170 228 365 325 422 552 545 875 1472 1620 1487 1795
Palm Oil 100 100 100 125 174 296 250 332 404 399 650 1114 1185 936 1373
Sesame 121 145 145 193 260 354 337 520 657 655 1010 1397 1499 2435 2677
Groundnut 112 139 148 150 198 304 382 460 661 598 1075 1498 1848 1683 1893
Chilli 202 128 159 298 444 386 598 587 1072 1861 1434 2031 2854 2923 4243
Onion 131 178 119 313 340 319 612 515 514 1646 1296 1762 1278 1156 3608
Garlic 228 189 143 201 594 613 385 561 779 1406 1098 1473 2214 1977 2772
Potato 163 209 255 361 466 469 739 898 1017 1222 1396 2589 2460 2571 2730
Fish 137 129 173 238 304 325 459 638 787 821 1179 1328 1543 1974 2624
Chicken 135 141 195 281 348 399 645 781 966 1051 1303 1583 1702 1937 2709
Pork 127 137 162 280 331 336 487 663 704 705 1064 1638 1675 1990 2826
Beef 221 149 177 281 363 386 478 565 615 619 696 1217 1603 1763 2063
4?Crops for State-
Owned Enterprises Sugar 183 198 198 248 395 458 432 631 930 1024 1003 1458 1638 1877 3163
127 155 192 234 302 369 493 604 736 883 1182 1578 1825 1794 2422
Note: 1-3 are calcurated based on the prices in Yangon. Rice is the retail price and the rest are wholesale price. 
The palm oil is also the retail price, but was also the official price until 1989.
For pegion pea and black gram, as there was no domestic demand for these pulses, ofiicial price was used here.
Sources: CSO, Statistical Yearbook  (1993,1995, 2001, 2002).
CPI
2?Crops for Import
Competition
3?Crops for the
Domestic Market
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Table 3:Major Agricultural Crops: Changes in the Sown Acreage, 1970-2002 ( Unit: thousand acres)
Rice Pulses Sesame Groundnut Vegetable Chilli Onion Garlic Cotton Sugacane Rubber
1970/71 12,294 1,576 2,510 1,735 186 145 47 18 466 108 217 22,338
1980/81 12,668 1,995 3,231 1,271 301 170 47 21 546 118 200 24,805
1987/88 11,531 1,863 2,933 1,327 391 146 46 26 425 133 193 23,870
1988/89 11,807 1,642 2,994 1,355 342 179 64 27 443 123 192 23,802
1989/90 12,057 1,934 3,158 1,380 342 182 57 27 379 113 190 24,344
1990/91 12,220 2,281 3,271 1,369 343 170 57 26 386 118 191 25,024
1991/92 11,935 2,945 3,184 1,261 391 202 60 28 424 136 188 25,426
1992/93 12,684 3,500 3,379 1,220 389 220 65 33 416 187 193 27,200
1993/94 14,021 3,553 3,211 1,204 391 194 57 30 356 154 205 28,134
1994/95 14,643 4,117 3,288 1,252 416 172 62 28 505 130 220 30,005
1995/96 15,166 4,808 3,153 1,303 445 158 66 29 937 165 259 31,837
1996/97 14,518 4,584 2,830 1,184 463 203 60 29 824 204 294 30,422
1997/98 14,294 4,967 2,430 1,111 514 190 69 35 659 266 333 30,336
1998/99 14,230 5,729 2,738 1,241 524 169 115 34 804 311 369 32,882
1999/2000 15,528 6,209 3,173 1,400 657 220 146 41 842 333 419 36,582
2000/2001 15,713 6,725 3,308 1,458 732 249 145 46 801 343 446 38,177
2001/2002 15,940 7,372 3,210 1,405 740 280 139 47 730 402 460 39,153
Statistics (  2001),  CSO, Statistical Yearbook  (2002).
1 Export Crops Total
Sown
Acres
2?Crops for
Import
Competition
4?Crops for State-Owned
Enterprises3?Crops for the Domestic Market
 
 
 
Table 4: Major Agricultural Crops: Changes in Yields, 1970 – 2002  (Unit: tons per acre)
Sesame Groundnut Chili Onion
(Rain) ( Dry)
1970/71 0.69 0.18 0.11 0.17 0.07 0.38 0.16 1.80 0.19 0.56 11.61
1980/81 1.13 0.29 0.13 0.16 0.07 0.44 0.19 2.37 0.25 0.67 15.50
1985/86 1.25 0.39 0.23 0.26 0.10 0.50 0.22 4.20 0.31 0.73 21.53
1990/91 1.19 0.29 0.23 0.26 0.07 0.46 0.19 3.05 0.28 0.72 15.50
1992/93 1.19 0.29 0.26 0.26 0.10 0.44 0.21 2.80 0.33 0.74 15.50
1993/94 1.23 0.29 0.26 0.26 0.10 0.48 0.22 2.79 0.29 0.75 15.50
1994/95 1.27 0.33 0.29 0.26 0.10 0.50 0.20 2.75 0.31 1.03 15.50
1995/96 1.21 0.33 0.29 0.23 0.12 0.56 0.22 2.87 0.24 1.04 17.23
1996/97 1.23 0.33 0.29 0.26 0.15 0.55 0.22 3.19 0.27 1.11 17.23
1997/98 1.23 0.36 0.33 0.29 0.15 0.56 0.24 3.30 0.31 1.11 17.23
1998/99 1.27 0.36 0.29 0.26 0.10 0.54 0.26 4.15 0.25 0.95 15.50
1999/2000 1.32 0.33 0.26 0.26 0.10 0.52 0.23 3.26 0.25 0.99 14.64
2000/2001 1.38 0.36 0.29 0.36 0.12 0.58 0.23 4.09 0.24 1.13 15.50
2001/2002 1.38 0.33 0.29 0.36 0.10 0.59 0.26 4.66 0.26 1.15 14.64
Sources: MAS (1994), CSO, Statistical Yearbook (2002).
Cotto
n Rubber Sugarcane
Green
Gram
Pigeon
PeaRice
Black
Gram
4?Crops for State-Owned
Enterprises
3?Crops for the
Domestic Market
2?Crops for Import
Competition1. Export Crops
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?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????
???????????????
1980/81 1985/86 1990/91 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/2000 2000/01 2001/02
????????????????????? 1761 1126 942 2321 1981 1952 1890 1602 2312 3021
???? 1355 763 172 440 126 38 167 65 208 754
?????? 152 238 515 1358 1272 1403 1135 1179 1658 1898
????? 11 15 13 46 107 45 116 54 92 59
???????? 46 32 11 12 4 1 2
?????? 82 56 3 180 171 134 100 75 67 76
?????? 4 18 1 3 26 21 10 11 1
???? 99 6 5 8 5 37
????? 12 4 228 278 293 298 350 217 271 196
?????????????????? 13 11 5 7 9 8 34 28 37 42
???????????????? 82 94 165 615 887 945 941 807 934 861
???? 58 13 36 159 219 289 307 229 291 310
?????? 24 76 114 407 560 559 569 529 598 519
????? 5 15 49 108 97 65 49 45 32
?????? 793 1046 999 1048 985 853 789 925 803 1880
???? 721 982 740 903 855 698 640 727 651 1423
????????? 72 64 259 145 130 155 149 198 152 457
????????? 2649 2277 2111 3991 3862 3758 3654 3362 4086 5804
??????????????? 295 188 158 207 192 237 223 508 687 415
??????????? 5 31 1110 4247
??????? 6 8 300 402 436 471 2722 3785 2970
????? 281 183 685 546 1032 2016 2403 2324 3068 3695
??????????? 3225 2654 2962 5044 5488 6447 6756 8947 12736 17131
?????????
???????????????????? 54.6 42.4 31.8 46.0 36.1 30.3 28.0 17.9 18.2 17.6
???? 42.0 28.7 5.8 8.7 2.3 0.6 2.5 0.7 1.6 4.4
?????? 4.7 9.0 17.4 26.9 23.2 21.8 16.8 13.2 13.0 11.1
????? 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.9 1.9 0.7 1.7 0.6 0.7 0.3
???????? 1.4 1.2 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
?????? 2.5 2.1 0.1 3.6 3.1 2.1 1.5 0.8 0.5 0.4
?????? 0.1 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0
???? 3.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
????? 0.4 0.2 7.7 5.5 5.3 4.6 5.2 2.4 2.1 1.1
?????????????????? 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.2
???????????????? 2.5 3.5 5.6 12.2 16.2 14.7 13.9 9.0 7.3 5.0
???? 1.8 0.5 1.2 3.2 4.0 4.5 4.5 2.6 2.3 1.8
?????? 0.7 2.9 3.8 8.1 10.2 8.7 8.4 5.9 4.7 3.0
????? 0.0 0.2 0.5 1.0 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.4 0.2
?????? 24.6 39.4 33.7 20.8 17.9 13.2 11.7 10.3 6.3 11.0
???? 22.4 37.0 25.0 17.9 15.6 10.8 9.5 8.1 5.1 8.3
????????? 2.2 2.4 8.7 2.9 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.2 1.2 2.7
????????? 82.1 85.8 71.3 79.1 70.4 58.3 54.1 37.6 32.1 33.9
??????????????? 9.1 7.1 5.3 4.1 3.5 3.7 3.3 5.7 5.4 2.4
??????????? 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 8.7 24.8
???????? 0.0 0.2 0.3 5.9 7.3 6.8 7.0 30.4 29.7 17.3
????? 8.7 6.9 23.1 10.8 18.8 31.3 35.6 26.0 24.1 21.6
??????????? 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: CSO, Statistical Yearbook (2002) .  
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Figure 1.  Changes in Rice Price
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Figure 2: Myanmar Rice Price: Ratio of Domestic Retail Price to International Price, 1983 – 2004
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Source: Rice International price( Thai rice) : IMF, International Financial Statistics ,?Rice :Domestic retail price, CSO, Statistical
Yearbook  (1991,1997,2000), CSO, Monthly Economic Indicators (March 2003).Market exchange rate:1988/89-1996/97
[ADB](2001):1997/98-2002/03?Tokyo Mitsubishi Yangon Representative Office.
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Table 6: Irrigated Acreage, by Type of Irrigation, 1974 – 2000 (Unit: thousand acres)
1974/75 1984/85 1989/90 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/2000
Canal Government 855 893 614 613 593 638 651 701 685 668 726 761 806
Farmer 700 691 664 665 651 645 601 618 608 636 634 600 611
Tank Government 130 98 394 388 378 416 418 389 350 435 455 408 462
Farmer 111 75 82 92 82 95 70 89 94 95 74 44 34
Tubewell 31 44 53 53 65 69 75 92 99 123 135 164 199
Pump 267 470 322 310 323 469 1,051 1,551 2,057 1,511 1,545 1,865 2,076
Other 318 411 354 358 375 411 437 403 448 378 363 340 362
Total 2,412 2,682 2,483 2,479 2,467 2,743 3,303 3,843 4,341 3,846 3,932 4,182 4,550
Source: GUM, Agricultural Statistics  (2001).  
 
Table 7: Paddy Land in Myanmar: Changes in the Sown Acreage, by Region, and Type of Rice (by season) Sown, 1993 - 2(Unit: thousand acres)
Monsoon PaddyStates and Division 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/2000 2000/01 2001/02
Ayeyarwaddy 3,232 3,226 3,279 3,237 3,229 3,224 3,323 3,369 3,372
Yangon 1,165 1,161 1,174 1,165 1,131 1,135 1,162 1,176 1,176
Bago 2,160 2,161 2,167 2,204 2,094 2,114 2,347 2,359 2,378
Mon 646 649 649 651 641 641 659 667 670
Total 7,203 7,197 7,268 7,258 7,095 7,114 7,491 7,570 7,595
Sagaing 1,102 1,133 1,144 1,260 1,260 1,257 1,404 1,404 1,331
Magwe 379 401 439 502 468 383 437 463 505
Mandalay 551 586 608 674 648 524 552 612 616
Total 2,033 2,120 2,190 2,437 2,376 2,164 2,392 2,479 2,451
Rakine 859 868 856 860 854 864 913 935 940
Tanintharyi 208 210 213 214 208 208 215 225 233
Total 1,067 1,078 1,069 1,074 1,062 1,072 1,128 1,159 1,173
Shan 859 867 866 873 793 787 874 898 954
Kachin 251 252 269 282 292 329 365 383 388
Kaya 61 66 68 70 67 44 51 68 68
Kayin 325 327 327 328 326 326 326 328 330
Chin 88 88 90 91 93 93 105 106 107
Total 1,584 1,599 1,620 1,645 1,571 1,579 1,721 1,784 1,847
11,886 11,994 12,148 12,414 12,104 11,928 12,732 12,992 13,066
Summer Paddy States and Division 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/2000 2000/01 2001/02
Ayeyarwaddy 1,120 1,435 1,613 1,223 1,277 1,412 1,597 1,619 1,625
Yangon 155 126 334 170 172 197 253 213 222
Bago 291 423 317 130 174 141 210 227 195
Mon 72 93 105 71 73 85 127 108 113
Total 1,638 2,077 2,369 1,594 1,696 1,836 2,187 2,167 2,155
Sagaing 150 179 203 124 124 95 134 82 243
Magwe 30 32 56 43 42 45 67 64 79
Mandalay 150 154 145 140 137 123 174 170 165
Total 330 365 404 307 303 263 375 316 487
Rakine 7 10 14 9 9 9 10 12 13
Tanintharyi 8 11 23 6 10 15 14 16 17
Total 15 21 37 15 19 25 25 28 30
Shan 33 37 36 36 35 49 59 60 56
Kachin 8 15 24 14 13 14 16 16 16
Kaya 4 6 8 9 10 3 8 8 8
Kayin 122 140 140 128 114 112 126 126 128
Chin 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Total 167 198 208 188 172 178 209 211 209
2,150 2,661 3,018 2,104 2,190 2,302 2,796 2,721 2,880
Sources: MAS Documents?1999/200-2000/01), GUM Agricultural Statistics (2001,1997).
Grand Total Area
Grand Total Area
Delta
Dry Zone
Coastal Area
Mountainous
Area
Delta
Dry Zone
Coastal Area
Mountainous
Area
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Table 8: Rice Production in Myanmar: Cost and Revenue Structure, by Major Regions
Area
Township in which Study Villages
Locate
Taundwingyi
(2000/01)
Taungyi
(1993/94)
Nyaung Shwe
(2000/01)
Season Monsoon Summer Monsoon Summer Monsoon Summer Monsoon Summer Monsoon Monsoon Monsoon
Type of Irrigation Rainfed Pump Rainfed Pump Canal Canal Canal Canal Rainfed/Tank Rainfed Rainfed
Number of Farmers in Sample 9 9 67 66 68 52 33 25 13 14 9
Sown Acres 17.4 8.1 8.6 6.5 4.4 3.3 4.1 2.7 5.2 4.2 2.4
Yield per Acre ( Basket/Acre) 46.8 86.8 45.4 67.7 45.1 66.8 56.2 69.0 25.4 35.1 44.5
?Gross Revenue 29427 53,324 17,615 27,526 10,042 15,128 29,171 42,093 11,865 13,904 31,238
?Current Input Cost 6,064 20,210 4,736 13,765 1,390 1,715 10,273 12,686 3,003 1,682 12,001
Seed 1,883 4,701 1,558 2,375 502 515 2,827 2,806 1,407 391 2,009
Manure 0 0 144 39 0 0 528 327 891 1,291 1,186
Chemical Fertilizer 3,704 9,438 2,702 8,599 888 1,200 6,405 8,813 640 0 5,923
Other Chemicals 53 600 39 174 0 0 240 594 65 0 2,519
Diesel Oil 424 5,471 293 2,578 0 0 271 145 0 0 365
?Labor Cost 8,629 7,410 7,884 6,400 2,750 3,339 5,937 8,178 3,107 5,336 15,395
Hired Labor 5,238 4,543 5,023 2,881 2,323 3,089 5,072 6,887 2,063 3,661 10,194
Family Labor?a) 3,390 2,867 2,861 3,519 427 250 865 1,292 1,044 1,675 5,201
?Capital Cost 5,277 8,336 3,963 7,271 822 846 5,927 8,493 3,591 2,532 5,682
Agricultural Machinery 1,696 4,980 983 5,017 186 178 2,488 3,471 162 104 1,906
Bullocks 3,284 3,264 2,564 1,791 636 668 3,430 4,256 3,166 2,428 3,335
Interest Payment 297 92 416 464 0 0 10 766 264 0 441
?Total of Production Cost??? 19,970 35,956 16,582 27,436 4,962 5,900 22,137 29,357 9,701 9,550 33,079
?Operator's Surplus????? 9,457 17,368 1,033 90 5,080 9,228 7,034 12,737 2,164 4,354 -1,840
?Income???a) 12,847 20,235 3,894 3,609 5,507 9,478 7,899 14,028 3,208 6,029 3,360
Share of Each Cost and Operators' Surplus in Gross Revenue ???
Current Input Cost 20.6 37.9 26.9 50.0 13.8 11.3 35.2 30.1 25.3 12.1 38.4
Labor Cost 29.3 13.9 44.8 23.3 27.4 22.1 20.4 19.4 26.2 38.4 49.3
Capital Cost 17.9 15.6 22.5 26.4 8.2 5.6 20.3 20.2 30.3 18.2 18.2
Operator's Surplus 32.1 32.6 5.9 0.3 50.6 61.0 24.1 30.3 18.2 31.3 -5.9
Note1: Year in brackets is the survey year.
Note2 :The Survey for Htantabin was done Fujita and Okamoto, and the Kyaukse(1993?94??and Taungyi  surveys were by Takahashi's Survey.
The remainder relate to surveys by srelate to surveys by survey by Kurosaki and others. 
Note3: Water charge is not available for every survey, and it is generally quite nominal (10-20 kyats per acre). It is not included in the current cost.
Note4: Summer paddy produced in Kyaukse is generally called " Mo-Kyaw Zaba" (pre-monsoon paddy) and has been produced for very many years. 
Note5: One basket equals 20.9 kg in the case of paddy. 
Sources: Takahashi (2000), Fujita and Okamoto (2001) , Kurosaki et.al (2004).
Mountainous Area
Kyaukse (2000/01?Kyaukse(1993/94)Myaungmya(2000/01?
Dry ZoneDelta
Htantabin(1998/99)
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Figure 3: Changes in the Supply of Chemical Fertilizer, 1985 – 2001
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Sources: GUM, Statistical Yearbook  (1995:1997:2002),  MOAI [2000 b], MAS Documents.
 
 
Figure 4: Estimated Changes in Chemical Fertilizer Application in Rice Cultivation, 1980 – 2002
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Table 9: Ratio of Rice Prices to Fertilizer (Urea) Prices, 1986 - 2005
Year
1986 1.3 ?
1994 0.6 ?
2000 ? 0.7
2001 0.3 0.3
2003 0.1 0.3
2005 ? 0.2
Sources: 1986,1994 are based on Takahashi ?2000, p.40?
The paddy price for 2000-2003 has been obtained from the authors' survey. 
es are from the MIS Bulletin.
For 2005, both rice and fertilizer prices have been obtained from Okamoto's survery.
Official Paddy
Procurement
Price/Official Fertilizer
Distribution Price
Market Paddy
Price/Market Fertilizer
Price
 
 
 
Table 10: Pulse Exports, by Major Destinations, 1991 – 2000
 (Unit: percentage)
Country 1991/92 1993/94 1995/96 1997/98 1999/2000
India 55.7 66.4 71.5 73.6 67.5
Pakistan 16.3 8.3 6.5 4.8 2.1
Bangladesh 0.0 3.4 0.1 0.2 0.7
Singapore 14.4 7.6 8.6 4.7 5.7
Indonesia 0.4 7.1 5.9 7.2 11.7
Malaysia 2.4 4.0 3.5 4.0 4.1
Japan 8.9 2.9 1.9 1.4 1.4
Philippine 0.3 0.1 1.1 1.2 0.8
Other 1.6 0.2 0.9 2.8 5.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: GUM, Agricultural Statistics (1997, 2001).  
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Figure 5: Myanmar Black Gram (Pulse) Prices Compared: Ratio of Domestic Wholesale Price to International Price,
1989 – 2002
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Sources: International Price : Government of India, Agricultural Statistics at a Glance (2003).
Domestic wholesale price: GUM, Statistical Yearbook  (1991,1997,2002).
Market exchange rate:1988/89-1996/97 -ADB (2001),
1997/98-2001/02- Tokyo-Mitsubishi Bank Yangon Representative Office.
 
 
 
 
Table 11: Changes in the Sown Area of Pulses, 1974 – 2000   (Unit: thousand acres)
1974/75 1984/85 1989/90 1991/92 1993/94 1995/96 1997/98 1999/2000
Area Black Gram 164 227 255 725 693 1,172 1,215 1,371
Green Gram 72 150 227 434 721 1,137 1,349 1,839
Pigeon Pea 197 201 155 280 571 617 622 761
Soy Bean 54 73 83 85 114 177 195 267
Cow Pea 98 145 148 210 241 392 364 509
Penauk 72 87 176 218 316 289 270 385
Garden Pea 57 78 63 69 91 90 92 92
Chick Pea 373 491 392 459 329 410 297 323
Total of the above pulses 1,087 1,452 1,499 2,480 3,076 4,284 4,404 5,547
Total of other pulses 1,226 1,491 1,297 1,506 1,568 1,882 1,781 2,238
Black Gram 9.9 11.0 13.2 24.6 19.5 24.4 24.5 22.1
Green Gram 4.3 7.2 11.7 14.7 20.3 23.6 27.2 29.6
Pigeon Pea 11.9 9.7 8.0 9.5 16.1 12.8 12.5 12.3
Total 26.1 27.9 32.9 48.9 55.9 60.9 64.1 64.0
Note: The cow pea acreage is the sum of the acreages under Pelun and Bokait.
Sources: MAS (1994), MOAI (2001).
Share in the
Total Area of
Pulses???
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Figure 6: Changes in Production of Black Gram by States and Divisions, 1974 – 2000
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Source:GUM, Agricultural Statistics (2001).  
 
Figure 7: Changes in Production of Green Gram by States and Divisions, 1974 – 2000
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Figure 8: Changes in Production of Pigeon Pea by States and Divisions, 1974 – 2000
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Table 12: Cost and Revenue Structure of Cropping Patterns that Include Pulses and Beans
Monsoon
Paddy
Black
Gram
Green
Gram
Monsoon
Paddy
Green
Gram Sesame
Pigeon Pea
?Mix cropped
with Sesame?
Green
Gram
Ground
nut Sorghum
Number of Samples 36 15 14 43 43 13 3 8 3 3
Sown Acres 9.4 5.6 3.7 11.8 7.9 4.2 8.2 4.1 4.3 2.4
Yield per Acre ( Basket/Acre) 40.0 6.3 4.1 46.7 7.5 6.6 1.0 3.8 40.6 ?
?Gross Revenue 18,071 30,648 20,630 25,405 25,538 32,563 3,035 12,052 56,890 19,067
?Current Input Cost 2,956 5,467 4,630 4,075 4,830 9,489 93 4,657 14,497 4,382
Seed 1,224 4,660 3,676 2,218 3,323 2,019 93 1,798 7,053 1,163
Manure 741 67 72 0 0 2,093 0 0 1,721 0
Chemical Fertilizer 805 159 357 1,853 786 4,185 0 1,808 5,723 3,038
Other Chemicals 125 417 525 4 720 1,193 0 1,051 0 181
Diesel Oil 61 165 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
?Labor Cost 7,486 6,156 4,846 8,313 3,948 4,772 1,554 4,836 7,313 2,163
Hired Labor 5,406 3,550 1,934 6,765 3,088 3,733 1,144 3,991 6,824 834
Family Labor?a) 2,080 2,606 2,912 1,548 860 1,039 410 844 489 1,329
?Capital Cost 4,433 4,488 4,085 7,250 5,145 3,132 49 1,947 2,330 2,292
Agricultural Machinery 637 344 148 67 3,390 0 0 157 0 0
Bullocks 3,607 4,144 3,891 5,648 1,657 2,299 44 1,449 2,224 2,292
Interest Payment 190 0 46 1,535 98 833 5 342 106 0
?Total of Production Cost?????? 14,875 16,111 13,561 19,638 13,923 17,393 1,696 11,440 24,140 8,837
?Operator's Surplus????? 3,197 14,537 7,069 5,767 11,615 15,170 1,339 612 32,750 10,230
?Income???a) 5,277 17,143 9,981 7,315 12,475 16,209 1,749 1,456 33,239 11,559
Share of Each Cost and Operators' Surplus in Gross Revenue ???
Current Input Cost 16.4 17.8 22.4 16.0 18.9 29.1 3.1 38.6 25.5 23.0
Labor Cost 41.4 20.1 23.5 32.7 15.5 14.7 51.2 40.1 12.9 11.3
Capital Cost 24.5 14.6 19.8 28.5 20.1 9.6 1.6 16.2 4.1 12.0
Operator's Surplus 17.7 47.4 34.3 22.7 45.5 46.6 44.1 5.1 57.6 53.7
Note1: All data is based on field survey in a township in each Division.
Note 2: The year of the survey is given in brackets
Note3: In Bago, either black gram or green gram is cultivated after monsoon paddy. 
Note4: In Magwe, sesame mixed with pigeon pea + green gram is the major cropping pattern.
 Formerly, the main pattern was ground nut followed by sorghum or cow pea or soy bean.
Sources: Kurosaki et.al (2004),Okamoto( 2006).
?Reference ?
Groundnut?
Sorghum
Magwe ?2000/01)
Upper Myanmar ?Dry Zone?
Paddy + Pulses Sesame/ Pigeon Pea + Green Gram
Bago (2000/01) Yangon ?1999/2000)
Lower Myanmar (Delta)
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Figure 9: Changes in the Supply of Edible Oils, 1986 – 2002 (Unit: thousand tons)
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Figure 10: Changes in the Price Index of Edible Oils, 1988 – 2003
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Source: CSO, Statistical Yearbook  (1993, 1995 ,2001, 2002).  
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Figure 11: Imports of Edible Oils and Exports of Pulses, 1986 – 2002 (Unit: million US dollars)
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Figure 12: Changes in the International and Domestic Retail price of Palm Oil, 1988 – 2003
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Sources: CSO, Statistical Yearbook (2002:1997). Monthly Economic Indicators?(April?2003]?International Price IFS ( Malaysian Export Price)
Market exchange rates: 1988/89-1996/97 ADB(2001):1997/98-2002/03?Tokyo-Mitsubishi Bank Yangon Representative Office.  
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Figure 13: Changes in the Sown Area of Vegetables and Fruit  (Unit: thousand acres)
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Source: CSO, Statistical Yearbook  (1997,2001).
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Changes in Meat Production, 1980 – 2002 (Unit: thousand tons)
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Figure 15: Fishery Products: Changes in Output and Exports, 1980 – 2002 (Unit: thousand tons)
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Table 13: Changes in Modes of Transportation, 1980 – 2001 
?Rate of Change ??
1980/81 1985/86 1990/91 1995/962000/01 80/81-85/86
85/86-
90/91
90/91-
95/96
95/96-
2000/01
Road ?Miles? 7,620 10,490 10,943 11,962 14,145 37.7 4.3 9.3 18.2
Asphalt 3,138 5,485 5,608 5,979 8029 74.8 2.2 6.6 34.3
Other  Surface 1,069 1,457 1,639 1,889 2991 36.3 12.5 15.3 58.3
Other 3,413 3,548 3,696 4,094 3125 4.0 4.2 10.8 -23.7
Small Trucks??Number? 3,818 6,527 10,355 19,629 24,229 71.0 58.6 89.6 23.4
Yangon 2,587 3,874 2,386 10,196 13,845 49.7 -38.4 327.3 35.8
Other Areas 1,231 2,653 7,969 9,433 10,384 115.5 200.4 18.4 10.1
LargeTrucks??Number? 30,863 34,064 22,188 23,199 29,663 10.4 -34.9 4.6 27.9
Yangon 11,490 12,651 10,032 10,039 8,112 10.1 -20.7 0.1 -19.2
Other Areas 19,373 21,413 12,156 13,160 21,551 10.5 -43.2 8.3 63.8
Source: CSO, Statistical Yearbook ( 2002).  
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Figure 16: Changes in the Sown area of Sugarcane and in Sugar Production, 1990 – 2001
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Source: Kudo ed. (2003, Table 1 , 265 ).
 
 
Figure 17: Cotton Production, 1987 – 2002  (Unit: thousand tons)
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